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Abstract
Beyond versus makes its contribution to the thriving industry of books that clarify or
recast nature-nurture issues through seven conceptual moves. The first is to posit a
divide between sociological and philosophical inquiry. As Tabery depicts them,
commentators on the science invoked in nature-nurture debates often focus on the
racist or other political views of disputants or on their flawed understanding of scientific
concepts. Tabery, in contrast, as a philosopher of science, explains past and present
disagreements as stemming from “a disagreement concerning how explanation works in
science.” (The other moves include explanatory and terminological divides, connecting
associations to mechanisms, rank-change versus divergence-only interaction, a single
category for nature-nurture.) This review essay, while operating for the most part on the
philosophical side of the divide, does promote more careful understanding of the
science of data analysis. This leads me to present alternatives to each of Tabery’s
moves, including, eventually, the sociological-philosophical divide.
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A shorter version of this paper has been published as Taylor, Peter J. (2015)
“Distinctions that make a difference? (An essay review of Beyond versus: The struggle
to understand the interaction of nature and nurture by J. Tabery),” Studies in History
and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, Part C, 51: 70-76.
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Genetic variants, definitions of interaction, philosophical concepts, analysis of
observations versus experiments, a focus on agricultural versus human subjects, a
book review…—all these things may make a difference. Whether they do depends on
other things, which may or may not be controllable. I tease out the potential
significance of these two opening sentences in this essay review of Beyond Versus.
Along the way, I identify and assess seven key conceptual moves Tabery makes in his
2014 contribution to thriving industry of books that clarify or recast nature-nurture issues
(reviewed in Appendix 1).

On Move 1, Dividing sociological and philosophical inquiry
As Tabery depicts them, commentators on the science invoked in nature-nurture
debates often focus on the racist or other political views of disputants or on their flawed
understanding of scientific concepts. Tabery, in contrast, as a philosopher of science,
explains past and present disagreements as stemming from “a disagreement
concerning how explanation works in science” (p. 5; from hereon page numbers on their
own refer to Beyond Versus). This essay operates for the most part on the
philosophical side of the divide in order to provide meaningful commentary on Tabery’s
distinctions and concepts. I do not make sociological or political interpretations of
flawed understandings, but I do promote more careful understanding of the science of
data analysis. This leads me to present alternatives to each of Tabery’s moves,
including, eventually, the sociological-philosophical divide.

On Move 2, Explanatory and terminological divides
Tabery proposes that the history of nature-nurture debates is not about scientists
contesting whether a given trait is determined by heredity or by the environment, but
rather about the significance they to the interaction of heredity and environment. The
scientists in the three episodes he examines in Part I talk past each other because one
side approaches interaction by partitioning variation, while the other seeks to elucidate
mechanism (Table 1, drawn from p. 124). The second of his key conceptual moves is
2

to identify this explanatory divide; understanding it enables us, Tabery argues, to move
beyond versus as well as gain insight into some bioethical issues arising in this era of
gene-based diagnosis. The alternative I suggest is to view the relevant sciences as
united under the variation-partitioning approach (Table 2) while divided by the meanings
given to interaction, which are as different as chalk, cheese-sticks, and lipstick. The
basis for this alternative view, which draws on my formative research experience in the
1970s analyzing data from large plant breeding trials (Taylor 2014a), needs to be laid
out before Tabery’s three episodes can be examined.
Table 1. The Components of the Explanatory Divide (Tabery)
Variation-partitioning

Mechanism-

approach

elucidation approach

Thing to be explained

Variation in a population

Developmental process

Causal question

How much?

How?

Thing that does the explaining

Cause of variation

Causal mechanism

Methodology

Statistical

Interventionist

Table 2. The Common Components of Analysis (this essay)
Variation-partitioning approach
Thing to be analyzed

Variation of an observed trait in a
population in a range of situations

“Causal” question

How much difference in an observed trait
is associated with differences in other
things?

Thing that accounts for the difference

Thing that is significantly associated with
the variation in the trait

Methodology

Statistical

The science reviewed in Beyond Versus centers on the statistical analysis of
data sets in which some given trait varies across a population of individuals (which may
be people, plants, fruit flies, and so on) of various degrees of relatedness, raised in
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various situations (which may be families, geographic locations, or specific conditions,
e.g., plants grown with 50 kg/ha of nitrogen fertilizer). The analyses are primarily of
observational data, which is derived from individuals that can be subdivided into
relevant categories (e.g., people raised in low socioeconomic status), and only in a few
instances of experimental data, which involves assigning individuals randomly to be
subject to specific conditions. Sometimes the categories into which individuals are
subdivided are defined by genealogical relatedness without knowledge of measurable
genetic factors that underlie the relatedness or by location without knowledge of the
underlying environmental factors in each location. At other times the categories are
defined by measured factors, such as presence or absence of a specific genetic
mutation, socioeconomic status, amount of fertilizer applied, and so on. (Factor is used
in this essay in a non-technical sense, referring simply to some thing whose presence or
absence can be observed or whose level can be measured.)
Statistical analysis of data connects the observations of a given trait to a model
that is static (in contrast to dynamic models such Newtonian equations governing
bodies in orbit). The models relevant to Beyond Versus can be divided into three types
(Figure 1; expressed in equations in Appendix 2):
A) a summation of variables (technical name effect) derived from the observations
(e.g., the value for the trait in a certain plant variety averaged over all the
locations in which it is grown);
B) a summation of measured genetic and environmental factors, each weighted by a
coefficient; and
C) a summation that combines features of A and B and in which the environmental
factor is experimentally manipulated.
The summation for each kind of model also includes a non-systematic residual
contribution. By adjusting the details of the model (e.g., for type B, the values of the
coefficients), the discrepancy between the observed values for the trait and the
prediction of the trait’s value based on the model can be minimized.
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Figure 1. Three kinds of model for statistical analysis of observations on traits
Location/family (A),
Measured environmental factor (B & C)
1

2

3

Variety/twin pair

1

(A & C),

2

trait

Measured genetic factor

3

values

(B)

4

etc

etc

Trait value for an individual

= overall average in data set for the trait + contributions for the Row +

in a given cell*

Column + Row-column-combination + Residual

Row contribution

for A & C = average over all the locations in which variety is raised**
for B = measured genetic factor weighted by a coefficient

Column contribution

for A = average over all the varieties raised in that location
for B & C = measured environmental factor weighted by a coefficient

Row-column-combination

= average over individuals in that cell – contributions for Row & Column

contribution
Residual

= difference between trait value for an individual and the sum of the above
contributions

* Some or many cells may be empty. For example, in studies of human twins, members of each pair are
raised in at most two families. ** In practice, genealogical relatedness of individuals is also taken into
account in estimating these contributions.

The variation in the trait can be subdivided or partitioned into components
associated with the different variables or measured factors in the models as well as the
variation of the residual discrepancies. Partitioning of variation, whichever type of
model is used, always entails a “how much” question in that statistical analysis
assesses which components of the trait variation are significantly greater than the
residual. When a component is not significant, the model is reformulated without the
corresponding terms. (Elaborations on these basic types and the technicalities of how
statistical significance is assessed do not affect the conceptual points made in this
essay.)
In particular, statistical analysis of the partitioned variation assesses whether
there is significant variation associated with interaction, the statistical term for the row5

column-combination contributions in Figure 1. The alternative view makes the following
features of interaction clear:
•

Interaction in statistical analysis is not dynamic in the sense, say, of two soccer
players contesting control of the ball.

•

Interaction is not synonymous with interdependence in a colloquial sense given that,
even if interaction were zero, each kind of contribution is conditional on the full set of
individuals and situations where they are observed. (For example, in model A, the
contribution of a variety/twin pair is not a property of the variety/twin pair, but is the
value for the trait averaged over all the particular locations/families in which it is
raised. Change the set of varieties and locations in which the trait is observed, the
size or even significance of the associations may change, as Turkheimer at al. 2003
illustrates. Similarly, in type B analyses, expand or contract the range of factors in
which the trait is observed, the size or even significance of the associations may
change.)

•

All three kinds of model are simple sums whether or not the interaction contributions
are significant (which is good reason to avoid the term non-additivity that Tabery, p.
22, following some researchers, uses to describe the presence of a significant
interaction).

•

No conceptual or empirical connection exists between the terms in the different
models, including the corresponding kinds of interaction, because the different kinds
of analyses involve different things—variables derived from the observations versus
measured factors.
Let me address two objections to this last point. The first possible objection: a

gradient of measurable, albeit yet-to-be-identified factors might run through the
variables derived from observations in type A and C analyses. This, however, need not
be the case, which is obvious when we think about, say, human height. Pathways of
development involving diverse combinations of genetic and environmental factors make
intuitive sense when we note the different timing of growth and the make-up of the final
height (e.g., long trunk, short legs versus short trunk, long legs) (Taylor 2014a, 19, 28ff).
The lack of conceptual or empirical connection between measured factors and variables
derived from the observations of traits is especially relevant in discussions of heritability.
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This is the technical term for the variation among the row contributions in type A
analysis as a fraction of the total variation and has nothing to do with the colloquial view
that a trait is heritable when it involves transmission of a gene or genetic factor from
parent to offspring. (This regrettable ambiguity is amplified when researchers who are
proficient in type A analysis refer to heritability as the “contribution of genetic differences
to observed differences among individuals.” The quote is from Plomin et al. [1997, 83],
but the interpretation is widespread and is repeated by Tabery, p. 47, 92; see Taylor
2014a, 24ff. The points noted briefly in Appendix 3 accentuate why the interpretation is
misleading. Similarly, interpretation of other fractions of variation in terms of differences
in yet-to-be identified environmental factors is not warranted.)
The second possible objection: measured environmental factors are involved in
both type B and type C analyses. However, the measured factors in type B analyses
need not be modifiable (e.g., chromosomal sex is a commonly measured but nonmodifiable genetic factor). Moreover, if the factors were modifiable, it does not follow
that modifying them would generate the differences observed in the original data set. In
other words, it does not follow that the difference that “makes” a difference as exposed
by statistical analysis of observational data is a factor we can modify to make the same
difference again. For example, lower income level is a significant factor associated with
smoking rates, but there is no reason to expect that disbursing $10,000 to poor smokers
would lead many of them to quit. After all, the dynamics through which a person
develops a low income and the dynamics through which a person becomes a smoker
are separately and jointly far more complex than any static statistical model can
capture. For the variables in type A analysis, as well as for all terms in type C analysis
other than the modifiable environmental factors, the point on conditionality above means
that it is not possible to undertake an intervention to change “the thing associated with
the variation.” In light of this and because measured factors in type B analyses are not
necessarily modifiable, Table 2 places “causal” in scare quotes and substitutes the
conventionally ambiguous statistical term “accounts for” for Table 1’s “does the
explaining.”
The points made in the preceding paragraph become salient when we return
later to discussion of mechanism. First, let us revisit the historical and current debates
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examined by Tabery in light of the distinction between the three types of data analysis
and the corresponding forms of interaction, where the analysis in each case involves
partitioning of variation of an observed trait in a population.
Reinterpreting three debates, historical and current
Opponents in nature-nurture debates about humans are often debating whether
or not society should do more to enhance the range of situations in which people
develop. In the Jensen-Lewontin debate discussed by Tabery (p. 46ff), Jensen
observed that compensatory preschool education programs that began in the late
1960s, such as Headstart, had only a transitory effect on boosting IQ test scores. He
saw the high heritability of IQ test scores, in combination with the lack of success in
reducing the gap between the average scores for black versus white Americans, as
conferring plausibility on the hypothesis that the gap is associated with differences
between the races in some yet-to-be-determined genetic factors (Jensen 1969, 1970).
In contrast, Lewontin, as Tabery (p. 50) notes, asserted that we can “boost IQ and
scholastic achievement [by] as much or as little as our social values may eventually
demand” (Lewontin 1970, 25). Lewontin was critical of heritability estimation and, even
more so, its interpretation, but one issue he did not take up was Jensen’s (1969, 39)
assertion that the contribution of interaction to variation in “intelligence” is small in
relation to other contributions. Lewontin and Jensen were both operating on the
variation-partitioning side of Tabery’s divide (Table 1), on the terrain moreover of type A
analysis, not of measurable genetic and environmental factors. One caveat: Later, the
arguments of Lewontin (1974, 1982) made use of examples like those offered by both
Fisher and Hogben in a debate forty years earlier.
In the Fisher-Hogben debate of the 1930s (p. 15ff), both researchers examined
cases in which different varieties were raised at different levels of an experimentally
manipulated environmental factor (type C analysis). Fisher found, for example, in
potato varieties subject to various levels of manuring, that the additional contribution
from variety-environmental factor combinations was not significant. Hogben, on the
other hand, found that the difference in numbers of eye facets in fruit fly strains was
sensitive to the temperature at which flies were raised. As Tabery (p. 32) notes, he
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drew the lesson that social inequalities could be diminished or exacerbated by the
medical, educational, and nutritional environments in which people were raised (echoed
40 years later by Lewontin). In opposing the eugenic sentiments of Fisher, Hogben
depicted the methods of partitioning variation that Fisher had been pioneering as the
basis for incorrect extrapolation of what has been observed to what was possible. A
problem for his critique is that the same variation-partitioning methods could be used for
analysis of the data in both cases. Moreover, because the environmental factors could
be experimentally manipulated, both cases could go beyond establishing associations
to illuminating mechanisms, albeit with the role of the genetic factors underlying the
different varieties remaining unknown. If we assume that the researchers had varied
the environmental factors across the feasible range, Fisher’s trials were showing that
the best yielding varieties on average could also get the best out of each level of the
environmental factor (manuring). There was no need for recommendations to farmers
about what varieties to grow or to plant breeders about which varieties to breed from to
be tailored to the specific level of manuring. Hogben’s experiments, however, were
showing that varieties could be influenced by an environmental factor (temperature)
similarly at some levels and divergently at others. In short, establishing what
associations (especially interactions) and mechanisms applied in general was not a
matter of contrasting concepts or methods—with Fisher and Hogben being on opposing
sides of Tabery’s explanatory divide—but an empirical matter that depended on the set
of varieties, the environmental factors manipulated when raising those varieties, and the
trait. Moreover, whatever Fisher and Hogben believed about the possibilities and
pathways for improvement in human populations, no such experimental manipulations
existed for human traits.
What Fisher and Hogben lacked is now, in Tabery’s view, provided by research
such as that of Caspi, Moffitt and colleagues on associations of human psychological
traits with combinations of measured genetic and environmental factors (i.e., type B
analyses). Caspi et al. (2002), for example, reports on antisocial behavior in adults in
relation to the activity of monoamine oxidase type A (MAOA) and childhood
maltreatment; MAOA deficiency is a strong predictor of antisocial behavior only when
the child has also been maltreated (Figure 2). In other words, there is interaction
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between the measured genetic and measured environmental factors. The scientific
debate about this kind of interaction, discussed by Tabery (p. 87ff), has revolved around
meta-analyses assessing the generality of findings of significant interaction
associations: Caspi et al. (2003) is confirmed by one study, but not by two others.
Tabery notes that authors of the latter meta-analyses are advocates of using GenomeWide Association (GWA) studies to detect associations between traits and multiple
genetic variants. Tabery positions GWA studies on the variation-partitioning side of his
explanatory divide, whereas he places research to detect association of traits with
combinations of measured genetic and environmental factors on the mechanismelucidation side. Under my contrasting view, both sides of the meta-analysis debate
operate on the variation-partitioning side, this time on the terrain of type B analysis.

Figure 2. Average adult composite antisocial behavior score in relation to levels of
MonoAmineOxidaseA and level of childhood maltreatment for a sample from Dunedin,
New Zealand (from Caspi et al. 2002, 852, reproduced with permission).
In summary, none of the three scientific episodes involve disputants
fundamentally divided by how to detect interaction even if they differ in the amount of
10

interaction found in their data sets. However, from one episode to the next, we see a
different kind of data analysis and meaning of the term interaction (Table 3).
Table 3. The significance of “interaction”* contributions in three scientific episodes
reviewed by Tabery
Partitioning variation
Observational data

Observational-experimental
data**

Episode

A. summation of variables

B. summation of

derived from the

measured

observations

factors

C. Hybrid of A and B

Fisher vs.

Contingent empirical matter for

Hogben

non-humans

Jensen vs.

(At the time) Jensen’s claim

(Later) Lewontin uses examples

Lewontin

about lack of significance not

like Fisher’s and Hogben’s to

a point of contest.

make his arguments.

Caspi et al. vs.

Disputed

GWA studies

empirical matter

* See text for elaboration of the points about the significance of interaction in the episodes. The scare
quotes are placed around “interaction” to emphasize that the term has different meanings in each of the
three kinds of analysis. ** Observed varieties and experimentally manipulated environmental factors

Moves 3-5, Connecting associations to mechanisms
[A] scientist explains a phenomenon by identifying and manipulating the variables
in the mechanisms responsible for that phenomenon, thereby determining how
those variables are situated in and make a difference in the mechanism (p. 109).
The concept of mechanism, much discussed by philosophers of biology during the last
decade or more, is the focus of Part II of Beyond Versus. Suppose that statistical
analysis of observations has identified variables or factors as associated with a given
trait. In light of the quote above, it is clear that, in order to connect these variables or
factors to a mechanism, they have to be manipulable. In the case of type C analysis,
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the environmental factors can by definition be modified, but this is not obviously the
case for the other variables and contributions in the three models used to assess
associations.
Tabery clearly imagines that measured genetic and environmental factors can be
manipulated when, in the third of his key conceptual moves, he positions the type B
analysis of Caspi and colleagues on the mechanism-elucidation side of his explanatory
divide and labels the method interventionist. Indeed Caspi et al. (2002, 853) conclude
that their results “could inform the development of future pharmacological treatments.”
The implication, in the context of research on childhood experience in relation to adult
behavior, is that, if low MAOA children could be identified, prophylactic drug treatment
could reduce their propensity to antisocial behavior as adults. To be more precise—and
to highlight the interaction component—such treatment could reduce their vulnerability
to childhood maltreatment in the sense of the risk that maltreatment would pave the way
to undesired adult outcomes. An easy rejoinder (as Tabery, p. 183-5 notes) would be
that, if childhood maltreatment could be prevented, children’s low MAOA levels would
no longer make them more likely to end up as antisocial adults. Some authors,
reviewed by Tabery (p. 173ff), have proposed monitoring and measures to prevent
maltreatment for children diagnosed at birth as low MAOA or want to avoid the problem
altogether by pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and elimination of low-MAOA embryos.
The preceding actions all depend on linking statistical associations to inquiry into
mechanisms by viewing the measurable factors as ones that can be manipulated. As a
general perspective, this view is not warranted. As noted earlier, the measured factors
in type B analyses need not be modifiable and, if they were, it does not follow that
modifying them would generate the difference observed in the original data set.
Measured factors that are statistically significant but not modifiable serve as an
invitation to researchers to probe further and try to expose underlying factors that might
be modified. For example, the higher incidence among African-American women of
pre-term delivery of their babies has shown to be associated with self-reported
experience of racial discrimination even after allowing for other factors associated with
that outcome—alcohol and tobacco use, depression, education, and income (Mustillo et
al. 2004). Perhaps, self-reported experience of discrimination is itself associated with
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further underlying factors, so that, as in the earlier smoking example, if there were
policies to directly counter experiencing discrimination, they would not have the effect
suggested by the static statistical model. Perhaps, however, investigations that take
this specific difference-associated-with-a-difference as an entry point for inquiry might
eventually contribute to understandings in which subjective experiences get brought into
a dynamic picture of the biological and social developmental processes that lead to preterm delivery—a picture, moreover, that could inform actions to reduce the disparity in
pre-term delivery.
These last sentences are intentionally tentative: It is a contingent matter whether
the full picture of mechanisms and processes of development can be pieced together so
as to inform possible actions. Let us illustrate such contingency with a key case
discussed by Tabery. He notes (p. 121ff) that variation in human populations in a gene
labeled BDNF (brain-derived neurotrophic factor) has been shown to be associated with
variation in hippocampal activity and with a test of spatial memory. As in the MAOA
case, the association has led to proposals for action, in this case, BDNF-enhancing
diets (evident by searching “BDNF boost spatial memory” on the internet). To make the
connection between this association and mechanisms, Tabery (p. 110ff) points not to
such actions, but to experiments in which BDNF is manipulated. The experiments,
undertaken on mice, have resulted in a multi-level explanation of spatial memory that
spans from changes in BDNF through activity of receptors, long-term potentiation of
neurons, maps in the hippocampus, to navigation of mazes. Now, the validity of mice
as a model for humans is an issue well recognized by researchers. Yet even to speak
of “mice” and “humans” is to adopt a framing that discounts the variation among mice
and the variation among humans. If, instead, we were to pay attention to the variation,
the first step would be to note that highly selected strains of laboratory mice are less
variable than undomesticated populations (Rader 2004) and experiments made on such
mice involve tightly controlled situations. To what extent, it might be asked, do
experimental observations hold for individuals from undomesticated populations raised
in varied and far more complex situations? If mechanisms have been exposed using
laboratory mice, to what extent do they depend on the controlled value of factors that
are not typically enumerated when describing the mechanism?
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To ask such questions is not to counsel despair. Experiments on humans are
possible, albeit with varying degrees of control over the subjects and conditions. Most
notably, randomized control trials (RCTs) look for an association with a single
manipulated factor, such as a drug versus a placebo, against a background of all other
factors varying randomly in the population. A newer approach, less well-known, is
Mendelian randomization (Davey Smith and Ebrahim 2007), which uses natural
experiments to look for an association between, for example, C-reactive protein (CRP)
levels in the blood and coronary heart disease (CHD) for people who have a rare
genetic variant that leads to life-long elevated CRP levels, but otherwise vary randomly
on other risk factors for CHD (such as smoking, bodymass index, and blood pressure).
(CRP levels are associated with an increased incidence of diabetes, hypertension, and
cardiovascular disease [Ridker et al. 2007], but Mendelian randomization cast doubt on
any causal connection [C Reactive Protein Coronary Heart Disease Genetics
Collaboration 2011].)
In general, experiments on humans involve, however, less control than in RCTs
or Mendelian randomization. It should not be surprising that, as noted earlier, even
when the measured factors can be modified, this need not replicate variation in the
dynamics that generated the original data and thus that association. Returning to the
MAOA case, medication throughout childhood could have side effects that might not
emerge until later in life; an experiment that involved pre-implantation elimination of lowMAOA embryos would bring at the very least all the long-term risks of being conceived
by in-vitro fertilization (e.g., Hargreave et al. 2013). Detecting and preventing childhood
maltreatment might require intrusion into many households, surveillance, and
intervention by state agencies, diversion of government budgets from other needs, and
so on. Such changes in the way society runs might well have consequences for the
development of children, even those whose MAOA levels were not low. The
conundrum is that we would have to know a lot about the processes of development of
children in their psychosocial context in order to interpret any experiment that sought to
translate associations based on type B analyses into knowledge about mechanisms, let
alone into insight about developmental processes.
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The contingency and complexities of relating type B associations to mechanisms
speaks to the fourth and fifth conceptual moves in Beyond Versus:
•

drawing on the concordance of the BDNF-memory association found in humans with
the experimental research on BDNF in mice, call such an association a population
mechanism and portray these as a bridge between the variation-partitioning and
mechanism-elucidation approaches;

•

adopt Waters’s concept of actual difference maker, which holds that, although many
genes might possibly make a difference to the development of a trait, the cause of a
difference in the trait can said to be the difference in the gene that is actually
associated with that difference.

These moves are hard to reconcile with this essay’s distinctions between type A and B
associations, between unmodifiable and modifiable measured factors, and between
associations and manipulating modifiable factors to generate the difference observed in
the original data set. If we take these distinctions into account, studies such as those of
Caspi, Moffitt and colleagues detect associations whose relevance to elucidation of
mechanisms is contingent. In other words, a statistical difference maker does not
necessarily make a difference. The connection between an association in a population
and mechanisms is susceptible to disconfirmation by experiments and invites scrutiny of
the relationship of experimentally altered dynamics to the dynamics that generated the
original data analyzed to show the association. The association is also conditional:
understanding it and formulating manipulations based on it requires attention to the
other measured factors experimentally or statistically held constant. The understanding
and manipulations need not extrapolate beyond the original population and situations.
In other words, possible difference makers are causally relevant.
An aside on Move 1, Dividing sociological and philosophical inquiry
One reading of Beyond Versus is that Tabery is impressed by advances in genomic
science, which makes him optimistic about elucidating mechanisms by moving
downward or inward into the molecular basis of traits. Yet, interesting mechanisms may
also be elucidated by moving upward or outward. Consider human metabolic diseases,

15

taking phenylketonuria (PKU) as an example (Paul and Brosco 2013). The cognitive
development of individuals with PKU is extremely impaired by the level of the essential
amino acid phenylalanine present in normal diets. The level of phenylalanine can be
manipulated to reduce greatly the impairment. Social support practices can be adjusted
to enhance compliance with the diet, as can policies regarding insurance coverage of
the diet. Changes in policies and practices regarding contraception and abortion can be
investigated in relation to the incidence of so-called maternal PKU—children born to
women who did not strictly maintain the diet. Relevant mechanisms can also, of course,
be investigated by moving downward/inward. Mutations in the PAH gene were long ago
shown to underlie PKU; the possibility of gene therapy, involving manipulation of PAH
genes in stem cells, is now being considered; researchers are examining the
responsiveness of individuals with different PAH mutations to a drug, BH4, that allows
for a higher-protein diet. Yet, such research on molecular genetic and pharmacological
mechanisms depends on further upward/outward experiments ranging from social
support to discourage individuals who take BH4 from going off the special diet
altogether to the implementation of government subsidies for the biotechnology
industry.
Now, philosophers of biology might not inclined to expand their research on
mechanisms in the upward/outward direction, but we can hardly come to conclusions
about which direction makes the most difference—leads to the most impact for the
science—without sociological inquiry into the funding of research and adoption of its
findings.

Move 6, Rank-change versus divergence-only interaction
Reservations about connecting measured factors with mechanisms have to be put aside
in order to review Tabery’s bioethical discussion, which makes up Part III of Beyond
Versus. In the sixth of the key conceptual moves that I identify, Tabery distinguishes
gene-environment interactions in which the average response of the two genetic
variants changes rank across the range of environmental factors from those in which
the differences in averages simply diverges sufficiently for the contributions of the gene-
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environment combinations in type B analysis to be associated with a significant fraction
of the trait variation. Tabery is concerned that, in the rank-change cases, any action to
improve the outcome at one end of the range will diversely affect the outcome for the
other variant at the other end of the range. For example, as indicated in Figure 2,
boosting MAOA for low-MAOA children to reduce their vulnerability to severe
maltreatment would increase the average anti-social behavior for low-MAOA children
who are subject to no maltreatment.
Tabery’s discussion of rank-change cases is based on plots, such as Figure 2, of
averages for the trait for the different combinations of measured genetic and
environmental factors. Variation around the averages is discounted, as is also the case
when considering prophylactic drug treatment and prevention of childhood maltreatment
(mentioned earlier). Such typological readings of data can be countered by paying
attention to variation and noting that, within each combination of factors, people show a
range of antisocial behaviors. Among children who experienced probable or severe
maltreatment, the ranges overlap, that is, some of the high MAOA individuals ended up
with higher antisocial behavior scores than some of the low MAOA individuals. Once
the resources are invested to screen children for MAOA levels, a troubling issue of
misclassification would arise given that attention would be focused on all low MAOA
children. Indeed, how could treating children according to their genetic group be
avoided if we do not know from a childhood MAOA assessment whether any particular
individual is one who would go on, after maltreatment, to become an antisocial adult?
(Taylor 2014a, 132ff). If misclassification is seen as a bioethical concern, it is a concern
that applies whether or not interactions are rank-changing.

Move 7, A single category for nature-nurture
The last conceptual move I identify in the book is actually one that Tabery makes at the
very beginning of Beyond Versus: subsume the different ways that researchers and
others invoke hereditary versus environmental influences under the one label nature
versus nurture; anything that seems to involve interdependency of those influences
becomes a matter of interaction (p. 1ff). The discussion in this essay allows us, in
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contrast, to distinguish four disjunct areas of nature-nurture science. First, through type
A analyses, researchers can try to compare how much variation is associated with
differences among means for varieties, locations, variety-location combinations, and
residual contributions (i.e., the ambiguously labeled genotypic, environmental,
genotype-environment interaction, and error variance). Second, through type B
analyses, researchers can try to compare how much variation is associated with
differences in measured genetic factors, environmental factors, gene-environment
interaction, and a residual component. Third, either through type A or B analyses,
researchers can compare the variation within groups (e.g., among Euro-Americans and
among African-Americans) to the difference between the averages for the groups.
Fourth, through investigations that might extend any of the preceding kinds of analysis
of observational data, researchers can piece together a picture of the processes of
development of a trait and, on that basis, speak to the fixity versus flexibility of traits. (A
fifth kind of nature-nurture science examines the basis for human traits in an
evolutionary past, but that lies outside the issues discussed in this essay.)
In the long history of nature-nurture debates, opposing sides often assume,
imply, or propose that these different sciences are speaking to the same issues. This
sense of equivalence or, at least, mutual relevance is evident most notably in
discussions that create or play on ambiguity in the meaning of the technical term
heritability as well as in unwarranted interpretation of other fractions of variation in terms
of differences in yet-to-be identified environmental factors. The misinterpretations of
heritability—or, more generally, of the relative sizes of different components of variation
estimated using type A analyses—may seem moot if they are seen merely as heuristics
to guide researchers when choosing which traits to investigate further to identify the
measured genetic or environmental factors. The use of molecular tools to identify
genetic variants associated with variation in traits is illustrated by the BDNF and spatial
memory case that Tabery discusses. Yet for human medical traits, the most powerful
new approach, Genome-Wide Association studies, has only found associations with
genetic variants that correspond to a small increase in incidence of the trait (McCarthy
et al. 2008). The hope had been to expose variants corresponding to a major increase
in incidence of the trait, and from that to gain insight into the mechanisms of the
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disease. Some researchers have conjectured that future advances in understanding
will come from finding and examining rare variants associated with a strong effect on
disease incidence (McClellan and King 2010). This conjecture assumes heterogeneity
in the genetic factors underlying the medical traits (see also Ioannidis et al. 2007). The
possibility of heterogeneity in the environmental factors as well (Taylor 2014a, 19ff)
makes even more tenuous the heuristic connection from type A analyses (estimating
heritability etc.) to type B analysis of measured genetic and environmental factors (see
also Appendix 3). Moreover, the results of the GWA studies might make a proponent of
type B analysis less optimistic than a decade ago about identifying associations of a
single genetic factor and a single environmental factor.
The connection between the first two and the third kind of nature-nurture
science—between group-average differences—is not addressed much in Beyond
Versus. A relevant conjecture I have is that, just as there was a manipulable level of a
measured environmental factor in Fisher’s and Hogben’s type C data analyses, the
components of variation derived from type A analysis have been imagined by
researchers (e.g., in debates about heritability of IQ test scores, p. 46ff) to correspond
to measurable, albeit yet-to-be-identified genetic and environmental factors. It then
seemed plausible that the same kinds of factors underlying variation within groups might
be associated with the variation between groups (strictly, to the difference between the
averages for the groups). Another, more sociological, conjecture is that genomics
allows people to posit a hereditary basis for traits of medical or social significance, such
as intelligence, and this bolsters and is bolstered by the power of selective breeding in
agriculture and a persistent or revived eugenic ideal of improving society by eliminating
the defective biology of individuals. (Appendix 4 provides perspective on this nexus by
reviewing what actions are actually possible based on type A associations.)
The connection to the fourth kind of nature-nurture science—fixity versus
flexibility of traits—is also not addressed much in Beyond Versus. However, one
relevant body of research is that of Kendler and colleagues, who have examined
incidence of depression in relation to a wealth of measured factors over the life course
as well as a factor derived from the relatedness of the individuals, which they label
“genetic risk.” In Kendler et al. (2002), for example, data on over 1,900 twins are used
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to fit the incidence of major depression in women to a model that accounts for 52% of
the variance in the trait. The model is static, but it is structured to include connections
from earlier-in-life to later-in-life factors, e.g., from risk by relatedness (genetic risk) to
neuroticism to low self-esteem to low education through stressful life event to major
depression, and thus provides a picture of development that is rich and plausible. (The
“Structural Equation Modeling” approach used works as if the value of the trait in model
B were, in turn, a factor on the right hand side of a second model B, and so on.)
Interestingly, many of the factors are conceivably modifiable (e.g., women with low selfesteem could receive counseling), but no therapeutic or policy interventions are
included in the factors examined even though only one of the many factors included in
the implied picture of the development of depression fits firmly on the nature side. In
any case, associations with the interaction contributions in type A, B, or C analysis
cannot be decisive. The relevance of these associations depends, as mentioned under
Move 2, on showing that the full range of locations or environmental factors has been
included in the observations. Turkheimer at al. (2003) shows, for example, that
heritability of IQ test scores, typically stated as being around 60%, is almost zero in
families of low socioeconomic status.
In summary, the four different kinds of nature-nurture science are not speaking to
the same issues. The connection often implied between type A and type B analysis is
not warranted except as a heuristic that is tenuous anyway; the tenuous heuristic is no
basis for assuming that the same kinds of factors underlying variation within groups are
associated with the difference between the averages for the groups; and models of
multiple measured genetic and environmental factors have yet to progress to a place
where they can speak to developmental fixity versus flexibility.
Another alternative, in closing, to Move 1, Dividing sociological and philosophical
inquiry
This essay has suggested alternatives to seven conceptual moves that are key to
Tabery’s account. However, with respect to Move 1, the essay has, for the most part,
joined him on the philosophical side. How, it might be asked, is the conceptual
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clarification we have both pursued supposed to make a difference? To the extent that
conceptual clarifiers envisage there to be scientists in our audience, are we saying or
implying that we make systematic and clear what you had not—or more systematic and
more clear? Or, we are endorsing researcher A over researcher B, or we can extend
researcher A’s thinking? Whichever of these messages fits best, it seems that we want
researchers to see that they have overlooked some things and decide to modify the
science with the goal of improving their accounts of the phenomena that constitute
reality. Yet, as sociology and history of science remind us, critique—which includes
conceptual clarification—is rarely decisive in shifting science. The production of
scientific knowledge also involves many, diverse practical considerations as
researchers employ equipment, experimental protocols, citations, the support of
colleagues, the reputations of laboratories, metaphors, rhetorical devices, publicity,
popular debates, funding, and so on (Latour 1987; Law 1987). Researchers linking
such heterogeneous resources are also traversing different domains of social action—
social worlds—to which they contribute to continuity as well as change (Clarke and
Fujimura 1992). (The diverse social worlds that intersect in the nature-nurture sciences
are readily seen by searching “nature nurture” in google books; see Appendix 1.)
Even when conceptual clarification is directed, more modestly, at commentators
on nature-nurture science, including philosophers of science, how much difference can
be made by a book or a book review is an open question. The answer would depend
on how much the attention, topics, funding, metaphors, and so on of the commentators
draw from the many and various currents of the genomic era (Taylor 2014b). To invoke
this sociological sphere is not to counsel despair for those of us with a penchant for
conceptual clarification. Rather, we can view the sociological embeddedness of our
audiences and of ourselves as an invitation to extend the necessarily partial
contributions we make to modifying scientific knowledge. Examination of conceptual
developments within the sciences can lead us into interpretive questions about the
social influences shaping scientists’ work or its application, which, in turn, can lead to
new questions and awareness of alternative approaches in those sciences (Taylor
2014a, 42ff). In this spirit, we could delve into the cross-reinforcement of distinct
nature-nurture sciences or the conflation of different meanings of interaction. We could
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puzzle over how associations exposed by statistical analysis are so readily translated
into proposals for action. And so on. Many interesting inquiries remain for conceptual
clarifiers and other commentators who want to help science and society—indeed,
science-in-society—move beyond nature versus nurture.
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Appendix 1. A review of books that clarify or recast nature-nurture
issues
The list of books below is a selection derived from searching “nature nurture” in google
books (see http://bit.ly/NvNbooks). The table to follow summarizes positions that run
through more than one book.
Number

Position

Contrasting position presented in the body of the
essay

1.

2.

3.

Heritability is a measure of the

Not correct. Type A analyses (estimating heritability

effects of genes and the remainder

etc.) have a tenuous heuristic connection with type B

of the variation is the effect of the

analysis of measured genetic and environmental

environment.

factors (see also Appendix 3).

The contribution of the environment

No position stated in the essay. However, just as in 1,

can be partitioned into shared and

the position implies a connection between type A and

non-shared components. (The non-

B analysis and is thus questionable (Taylor 2014a,

shared eclipses the shared.)

115-116).

Nature-nurture debate refers to

Position 3 combines four kinds of nature-nurture

relative strength of genetic and

science, which have no clear conceptual or empirical

environmental influences in the

connection between them.

development of traits of an
individual, in variation across a
population, and in differences
between groups.
4.

Traits are caused by complex

In a dynamic sense of interaction, yes. The nature-

interactions between genes and the

nurture sciences reviewed in this essay concern,

environment at every stage of

however, the analyses of quantitative data that do not

biological and psychological

directly address development and in which interaction

development.

is a statistical concept. Investigations that extend the
analysis of observational data are needed for
researchers to piece together a picture of the
processes of development of a trait (and, on that basis,
speak to the fixity versus flexibility of traits).
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5.

In analyses of observational data

Contributions in any analysis of variance (types A-C):

categorized by some genetic factors

a) are conditional on the full set of individuals (or

and environmental factors

varieties) and situations (or locations) where they are

contributions* provide insight about

observed; and b) are not necessarily modifiable to

intervention to alter the trait in

reproduce that variation.

question. [*meaning as given in this
essay]
Book

Position in relation to

Position in relation to other issues

issues raised in the
body of the essay
Fausto-Sterling, A. (1985).

4.

Genetic does mean unchangeable. In

Myths of Gender. New York:

particular, children show flexibility in gender

Basic Books.

self-concept. Views of sexual and gender
development are biased towards male
development.

Flynn, J. R. (2012). Are We

Focuses on marked differences between

Getting Smarter? Rising IQ

generations in average test scores, with some

in the Twenty-First Century.

attention to differences between racial groups

Cambridge: Cambridge

and gender. Offers explanation of the former

University Press.

(rejecting hypotheses that genetics, in the
form of outbreeding, could be involved). Issue
not settled whether racial differences are
genetic or environmental in origin.

Goldhaber, D. (2012). The

4, but presents 1, 2, and

Nature-nurture science (1-3) does not provide

Nature-Nurture Debates.

3 without disputing them

insight into the development of traits of an

Cambridge: Cambridge

on their own terms.

individual or the influence of development on

University Press.

evolution.

Harris, J. R. (2009). The

1, 2, 3 + the environment

The child’s interaction in peer groups is the

nurture assumption: Why

is shaped by the child’s

primary and natural determinant of their

Children Turn Out the Way

genes, not by shared

personality.

They Do. New York: Free

family upbringing.

Press (2

nd

Ed.)
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Kaplan, G. and L. J. Rogers

Addresses separately all

Focusing especially on gender and sex

(2003). Gene Worship:

four kinds of nature-

development, modifiable interactions occur at

Moving Beyond the

nurture science.

every stage of development.

Keller, E. F. (2010). The

1 + notes slippage

More attention is needed to what genes do

Mirage of a Space between

between heritability and

during development.

Nature and Nurture.

heritable.

Nature/Nurture Debate over
Genes, Brain, and Gender.
New York: Other.

Durham, NC: Duke
University Press.
Lewontin, R. C., S. Rose, et

Careful in definition and

al. (1984). Not in Our

interpretation of

Genes: Biology, Ideology

heritability (but not

and Human Nature. New

explicit about the

York: Pantheon.

contrasting position to 1

High heritability does mean unchangeable.

presented in the body of
the essay).
Lewontin, R. C. (2000). It

1.

Ain't Necessarily So: The

Heritability provides no information about
changeability (see alternative to 5).

Dream of the Human
Genome and Other
Illusions. New York: New
York Review of Books (esp.
Chapter 1)
Longino, H. (2013).

1, 2, 3 + heritable and

Pluralism: Each method of studying behavior

Studying human behavior:

heritability treated as

is best seen as a partial view, not a competing

How scientists investigate

synonyms.

view to other methods, such as molecular

aggression and sexuality.

behavioral genetics.

Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Moore, D. S. (2001). The

4, but presents 1 & 3

The focus of research should be on the

Dependent Gene: The

without disputing them.

development of traits of an individual (for

Fallacy of "Nature vs.

which 1 & 3 are not helpful).

Nurture". New York: W. H.
Freeman.
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Pinker, S. (2002). The Blank

1, 2, 3 + heritable and

Opposition to hereditarian explanations

Slate: The Modern Denial of

heritability treated as

follows from the theory that the mind is a

Human Nature. New York:

synonyms.

blank slate, which distorts understandings of

Viking.
Plomin, R. (1990). Nature

gender, upbringing, violence, and more.
1, 2

and Nurture: An Introduction
to Behavioral Genetics.
Pacific Grove, CA:
Brooks/Cole.
Ridley, M. (2003). Nature

1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (with

The action of genes (nature) is influenced by

Via Nurture : Genes,

reservations about the

experience (nurture). The effect of that

Experience, and What

significance of heritability

experience or environment varies with the

Makes Us Human. London:

and non-shared

genes an organism has.

Fourth Estate.

environmental
components)

Rutter, M. (2006). Genes

1, 2, 5 (except questions

Special attention given to interaction between

and Behavior: Nature-

that non-shared eclipses

measured genetic and measured

Nurture Interplay Explained.

the shared).

environmental factors.

Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Tomasello, M. and D. I.

In the development of language, knowledge

Slobin (2005). Beyond

comes from the “interaction between genes,

Nature-Nurture: Essays in

bodies, and environments, unfolding

Honor of Elizabeth Bates.

overtime… and the ways in which structures

Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence

can arise without being prespecified.”

Erlbaum.
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Appendix 2. Three types of model for statistical analysis of
observational and experimental data

yijk =

m

+ vi

+ lj

+ vlij

+ rijk

(A)

where yijk denotes the observed value of the trait y for the ith variety* in the jth location*
and kth replication, which is modeled as a sum of the following variables:
m for a base level for the trait;
vi for the contribution of the ith variety;
lj for the contribution of the jth location;
vlij for the additional contribution from the i,j variety-location combination not already
given by the preceding two contributions; and
rijk for the residual contribution.
yijk =

mB

+ αgi + βej + γgiej + rijk

(B)

where yijk is observed value of the trait y for the ith measured genetic factor under the jth
measured environmental factor and kth replication, which is modeled as a sum of the
following measured factors multiplied by coefficients a, b, g:
mB for a base level for the trait;
αgi for the contribution of measured genetic factor i;
βej for the contribution of measured environmental factor j;
γgiej for the additional contribution from the i,j gene-environment combination not
already given by the preceding two contributions; and
rijk for the residual contribution.
yijk =

mC

+ vi

+ βej + γiej + rijk

(C)

where yijk is observed value of the trait y for the ith variety under the jth experimentally
manipulated environmental factor and kth replication, which is modeled as a sum of
the following variables and measured factors multiplied by coefficients β, γi:
mC for a base level for the trait;
vi for the contribution of the ith variety;
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βej for the contribution of experimentally manipulated environmental factor j;
γiej for the additional contribution from the i,j variety-environment combination not
already given by the preceding two contributions; and
rijk for the residual contribution.
* Varieties are often called genotypes despite the lack of knowledge of the measurable
genetic factors that underlie the relatedness of individuals in a variety/genotype.
Similarly locations are called environments without knowledge of the environmental
factors present in each location/environment. In any case, in the equation for type
A, to use the symbols gi and ej for genotype and environment would invite confusion
with the conceptually and empirically distinct terms in the equation for type B.

30

Appendix 3. Heritability of a trait does not measure the contributions
of genetic differences to observed differences among individuals
1. Readers with a technical knowledge of heritability may note that, when
estimating heritability from datasets in which varieties have varying degrees of
genealogical relatedness (e.g., identical or monozygotic twins versus fraternal or
dizygotic twins), models often refer to theoretical genes that each add a small
contribution to the trait. However, analyses built around these models are of
observations of traits, so there must be alternative formulations making no reference to
genes (Taylor 2014a, 55-76).
2. Consider one way to estimate heritability for a human trait, namely, comparing
the similarity of identical twins, who share all their genes, with the similarity of fraternal
twins, who share a smaller fraction; in both cases, the twins are raised together. Even if
the similarity between twins or a set of close relatives is associated with the similarity of
yet-to-be-identified genetic factors, the factors may not be the same from one set of
relatives to the next, or from one location to the next. In other words, the underlying
factors may be heterogeneous (Taylor 2014a, 19).
3. The possibility of underlying heterogeneity disturbs any intuition that a
measurable genetic factor (or composite of factors) runs through the differences among
variety means. We would not assume such a genetic gradient exists if the varieties
were from different species or taxonomic classes. Yet the partitioning of variation
involved in estimation of heritability and other components could, in principle, be
undertaken even if varieties were not from the same species (Taylor 2014a, 28ff).
4. Even if there were such a gradient, it is difficult to move from type A variationpartitioning to hypotheses about underlying measurable factors even in the ideal case of
such analysis, namely, the full agricultural evaluation trial (see Appendix 4). For the
analysis of human observations, where a variety (or genotype) is replicated at most two
times in at most two locations (environments), it is not possible to group similar varieties
and locations and, on that basis, generate hypotheses about underlying factors (Taylor
2014a, 30ff).
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5. To add further ambiguity, in recent years the term heritability has begun to be
used to refer to the fraction of variation in a trait associated with variation in SingleNucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs) as examined by Genome-Wide Association (GWA)
studies. There is no conceptual connection between this new heritability and the
classical concept (Taylor 2014a, 124-5).
6. The slippage between, or conflation of, type A and B analysis is fostered by
ambiguous terms. In agricultural trials, varieties have often been called genotypes even
though no claim is made that a pair of alleles—the strict meaning of genotype—defines
the variety. Variation among the variety contributions in model A is then variation
associated with difference between genotype means (or “genotypic values”), shortened
to genotypic variance (variance being the technical statistical measure of variation) and
then, unfortunately given its ambiguity, to genetic variance. Similarly, variation among
location means is often referred to as environmental variance. Yet no genetic or
environmental factors are used in the making of type A analyses; genetic variance does
not refer to variation among measurable genetic factors.

32

Appendix 4. Actions based on type A analysis, including assessment
of the degree of interaction, and to investigation of mechanisms
The distinction between type A and B analysis is illuminated by examining the
possibilities and limitations of type A analysis with respect to actions based on the
analysis, including assessment of the degree of interaction, and to investigation of
mechanisms.
Consider, as an example of data and analysis of type A, the case of an
agricultural evaluation trial where it is possible to observe a trait, say, yield, in a set of
plant varieties in each of a set of locations, and to raise replicates for each varietylocation combination (e.g., Byth et al. 1976). The variety contributions (see Figure 1
and Appendix 2) can be simply given by subtracting the overall mean for the data from
the means of each variety when averaged over all the locations and replications in
which it is grown. Similarly, for the location and variety-location interaction
contributions. If the variation of the variety means is significant and we can imagine
growing in the same locations the varieties that have the best mean yields, then we
would expect to improve yields overall. Secondarily, plant breeders may cross the best
varieties overall and expect yield improvement in proportion to how much of the
variation is associated with the variety means. If some of the crosses turn out not to
yield well, they can be discarded, while only those that yielded well get used.
Now, if the variety-location interaction contribution is also significant—which is
typically the case in large crop evaluation trials (e.g., Byth et al. 1976)—then one variety
may be highest yielding in one location but not in another—or, at least, the difference
between any two varieties may change substantially from location to location (Taylor
2014a, 55). Interaction in this type A sense makes it difficult for agricultural researchers
to provide a single recommendation to farmers on which variety to plant.
Recommendations about what to grow need, instead, to be tailored to some subset of
the locations.
The last two paragraphs indicate that crop recommendations and plant breeding
decisions can proceed without an understanding of mechanisms. Indeed, the variables
associated with the partitioned variation are not modifiable things. However, while such
actions are being taken, researchers can also go on to investigate further to expose
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what it is happening in the locations with the best yields. As described in Taylor (2014a,
95ff),
varieties can be grouped by similarity in responses across all locations using
techniques of cluster analysis (Byth et al. 1976). Similarly, locations can be
grouped by similarity in responses elicited from varieties grown across those
locations. Varieties in any resulting group tend to be above average for a location
in the same locations and below average in the same location. The wider the
range of locations in the measurements on which the grouping is based, the
more likely it is that the ups and downs shared by varieties in a group are
produced by the same conjunctions of measurable factors… For example,
imagine a group of plant varieties that originated from particular parental or
ancestral stock that is more susceptible to plant rusts (a form of parasitic fungi),
and that these varieties had a poor yield in locations where rainfall occurred in
concentrated periods on poorly drained soils. The obvious hypothesis about
genetic factors modulated by environmental factors is that these varieties share
genes from the parental stock that are related to rust susceptibility and this
susceptibility is evident in the measurements of yield in locations where the
rainfall pattern enhances rusts.
On the basis of such a hypothesis, plant breeders might cross the rust-susceptible
varieties that yield well in other locations with rust-resistant varieties and look for
progeny that are resistant and yield well in the rust-promoting locations. Alternatively,
the original varieties might be evaluated in the same sites but with enhanced soil
drainage practices. Success or failure in exposing mechanisms at the level of, for
example, parental stock used in crosses or soil drainage will affect whether the
researchers see any need to delve further into the genetic and environmental factors
that influence the yields shown by the varieties in the various locations where they are
grown. In other words, whether knowledge about mechanisms is needed for progress
in agricultural science based on type A analyses all depends.
Now let us contrast the situation when the observations are of traits in human
populations. First, the option of selective breeding and discarding crosses that turn out
not to “yield” well is not available. Nor is it possible to reduce the interaction
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contribution by grouping of varieties and subsequently forming hypotheses based on
those groups. In short, type A analysis of human data does not provide a basis for
actions based on the analysis or investigation of mechanisms. Regarding the
assessment of the degree of interaction, it is possible, given the appropriate data sets,
to separate the variety contributions from those of the variety-location (genotypeenvironment) combinations. The data needed is, for the one population, of twins raised
apart, twins raised in the same family, and unrelated individuals raised in the same
family (Taylor 2014a, 62). Such data sets are, however, rare. Plomin et al. (1977) is
often cited in the context of claims that such interaction variation is not significant for
humans, but this work considers as a proxy for variety-location interaction a quantity
derived from a type B analysis of, for example, data on educational attainment, in which
the measured factors are the average for biological parents and the average for
adoptive parents. Tabery (152ff) reviews the evidence for low values of such proxy
measures, but how well they reflect the actual type A variety-location interaction is hard
to assess in the absence of studies for a range of human traits in which the classes of
data are collected that allow the separation of variety from variety-location contributions.
It is necessary to show that the latter contributions are negligible in order to be sure that
reported heritability estimates for human traits capture only the differences among
variety (genotype) contributions. Ditto, to interpret the trend that Plomin (1999, C26)
and others have noted for heritability estimates to increase over people's lifetimes. It
could be that the interaction contribution, subsumed in estimates labeled as heritability,
is increasing over time. For this reason, over and above the points made in Appendix 2,
interpreting this trend as evidence that genetic differences come to eclipse
environmental differences (Plomin 1999, C26) is not warranted (Taylor 2014a, 73-74).
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